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Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber
FOR THE first time in a century, a set of large, populous and increas-
ingly wealthy states—this time China, India 
and Russia—are on the cusp of achieving 
great-power status. The most important 
and most uncertain foreign-policy question 
facing American decision-makers over the 
next decade is simply this: What will be the 
relationship between these rising powers 
and an international system still governed 
by “Western” conceptions of order and 
based on the primacy of post–World War 
II U.S.-sponsored rules, drawn from liberal 
models of capitalism and democracy? 
International-relations theory and 
American foreign-policy analysis alike por-
tray rising nations as spokes to the hege-
mon’s hub, forced to make a simple choice: 
They can directly challenge the United 
States for international leadership, leading 
to conflict, or they can integrate into the 
existing liberal order, leading to a peace-
ful evolution in which rising powers adapt 
to the American system, rather than make 
fundamental modifications to it. The future 
of world politics then is either systemic 
conflict or eventual assimilation. 
An example of the typical analysis 
locked in the binary paradigm comes from 
Aaron Friedberg in International Security: 
“What is likely to be the character of the 
relationship between the United States 
and the [People’s Republic of China] over 
the next two or three decades? Will it be 
marked by convergence toward deepen-
ing cooperation, stability, and peace or by 
deterioration, leading to increasingly open 
competition, and perhaps even war?”
By this logic, the high level goal of 
American foreign policy is to structure the 
choice facing rising powers so that integra-
tion and assimilation are heavily favored, 
while hedging against the possibility of 
conflict, without allowing the hedge to be-
come a self-fulfilling prophecy. That has 
practically become a Washington, DC man-
tra, with bipartisan support. The disagree-
ments among China hawks, China doves 
and China “realists” are not really about 
logic, they are about how much hedging is 
enough and how much is too much.
If only it were that simple. Rising pow-
ers are not bound to this set of strategic 
choices. The wishful mythology of a sin-
gle and flattening world is convenient for 
Americans to believe, but wrongheaded. 
The technologies of globalization empower 
connectivity, but do not dictate equal terms 
of connection. The post–Cold War period 
is not a story of gradual modernization and 
progressive integration that connects the 
world uniformly to the benefit of all. In-
stead, it enables a distinct alternative to 
conflict and assimilation, whereby rising 
powers are increasingly “routing around” 
the West. By preferentially deepening their 
own ties amongst themselves, and in so 
doing loosening relatively the ties that bind 
them to the international system centered 
in the West, rising powers are building an 
alternative system of international politics 
whose endpoint is neither conflict nor as-
similation with the West. It is to make the 
West, and American power in particular, 
increasingly irrelevant. 
What is emerging is a “World With-
out the West.” This world rests on a rapid 
deepening of interconnectivity within the 
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developing world—in flows of goods, 
money, people and ideas—that is surpris-
ingly autonomous from Western control, 
resulting in the development of a new, par-
allel international system, with its own dis-
tinctive set of rules, institutions and curren-
cies of power. This system empowers those 
within it to take what they need from the 
West while routing around American-led 
world order. The rising powers have begun 
to articulate an alternative institutional ar-
chitecture and distinct modes of gover-
nance that form the skeleton of their own, 
and very real, sustainable and legitimate (in 
the eyes of much of the rest of the world) 
political-economic order.
Wishful thinking and conceptual blind-
ers together prevent Americans from seeing 
the emergence of a World Without the 
West for what it really is. Our foreign-pol-
icy choices are going to be made tougher 
than we think. 
IN 2005 Robert Zoellick used the term “responsible stakeholder” to 
lay out a positive view of how and why a 
rising China would assimilate to the Ameri-
can-led world order. The underlying story 
is familiar: As rising powers integrate their 
economies with the West, the benefits of 
connectivity rise and the opportunity costs 
of conflict become too high to bear. The 
Chinese will come to recognize their stake 
in the status quo (the “stakeholder” part) 
and ramp up their contributions to global 
public goods needed to sustain it (the “re-
sponsible” part). The story often goes on 
to suggest that eventually the growth of the 
developing world’s middle class will drive 
escalating demands for domestic demo-
cratic change. Mixing elements of 1960s-
style modernization theory with 1990s-
style democratic peace theory, the assimila-
tionists expect rising powers to evolve in a 
direction that makes them want essentially 
what the United States wants out of inter-
national politics.
The endpoint of this argument is a rea-
sonably functional, moderately adapted, 
but essentially familiar liberal world order 
where today’s norms and rules have evolved 
somewhat, to take account of the new dis-
tribution of power, but have not really been 
overturned. In this view, the tensions in 
today’s world—around offshoring and pro-
tectionism, intellectual-property debates, 
carbon emissions and who pays to reduce 
them—are stresses and strains, not funda-
mental cleavages. They are more like the 
burden-sharing squabbles that NATO allies 
suffer than anything else. They are simply 
the growing pains of a new global political 
economy still structured basically around 
American-sponsored rules. 
The assimilationists are surely right to 
presume that the rising powers of the 21st 
century don’t want to fight their way to 
international stature. War with the Unit-
ed States in a nuclear age is not a viable 
means for re-balancing international poli-
tics. But assimilating to an American-led 
liberal world order is not attractive either. 
As that order makes increasing demands 
on how domestic politics should be con-
figured, it of course becomes less and less 
attractive to autocratic developing regimes. 
Today’s rising powers are as different from 
the United States as Japan and Germany 
were from Britain in the late 1800s. Com-
munal, rather than individual, traditions are 
strong. State stewardship of the economy is 
the dominant ideology. Raw power trumps 
contract law as the preferred means of arbi-
trating disputes. These are real differences 
with deep roots in economics and society, 
and—the hopeful notions of crude modern-
ization theory notwithstanding—they are 
not being driven out by consumer goods, 
the Internet or increased GDP. 
The liberal order directly threatens the 
legitimacy and authority that flows from 
the rising powers’ ideas about order and 
governance. It does not mesh with their 
proposed relationship between individual, 
state and society. And so it makes sense for 
these states to use the forces of globaliza-
tion to gradually revise the terms of their 
connection with the Western world in ways 
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that enhance their autonomy.
They are empowered to do this by the 
same technology that Americans like to 
think flattens the world. Container shipping 
and the Internet do connect the world, but 
they don’t have to connect everyone equal-
ly. And they are, in fact, not doing so. Con-
sider the evolution of international trade 
patterns over the last 15 years. Though 
global trade has been increasing as a whole, 
the twenty largest and wealthiest countries 
in the developing world are, overall, prefer-
entially trading with the rising powers that 
lead the pack—China, India, Russia and 
Brazil. And the rate at which they are doing 
so is rising every year. The critical fact here 
is that this deepening of interconnectivity 
in the World Without the West is well in 
excess of what standard economic models 
of trade (the gravity model) would predict. 
Given that these models already control for 
a number of factors thought to affect bilat-
eral trade, including GDP, this means that 
these patterns cannot be explained away by 
blistering economic growth in China and 
India.
The same goes more generally for for-
eign direct investment and telecommunica-
tions. As a result, Chinese foreign invest-
ment in large public infrastructure projects 
has begun to revitalize long-moribund Af-
rican cities, such as Luanda, Angola. Mean-
while—as part of $1.9 billion in trade deals 
between Chinese and African leaders in 
November 2006—Chinese companies are 
committed to such diverse projects as build-
ing expressways in Nigeria, laying a tele-
phone network in rural Ghana and building 
an aluminum smelter in Egypt. But this 
isn’t a story just about China. Venezuelan 
leader Hugo Chávez signed $200 million 
worth of trade deals with Iran just days 
before his infamous 2006 appearance at 
the UN General Assembly podium and has 
promised subsidized oil for his Bolivarian 
allies in Latin America. And in 2005, Russia 
surpassed the United States as the largest 
supplier of arms to the developing world, 
with China, India and Iran as the Kremlin’s 
most reliable customers.
The landscape of globalization now 
looks like this: While connectivity for the 
globe as a whole has increased in the last 
twenty years, it is increasing at a much fast-
er rate among countries outside the West-
ern bloc. The World Without the West is 
becoming preferentially and densely intercon-
nected. This creates the foundation for the 
development of a new, parallel international 
system, with its own distinctive set of rules, 
institutions, ways of doing things—and cur-
rencies of power. 
THE WORLD Without the West, like any political order, is made 
up of two ingredients: A set of ideas about 
governance and a set of power resources 
that enable, embed and occasionally enforce 
those ideas. This alternative order rests on 
wealth drawn from natural resources and 
industrial production (along with the man-
agement expertise applied to those capabili-
ties). And it proposes to manage interna-
tional politics through a neo-Westphalian 
synthesis comprised of hard-shell states that 
bargain with each other about the terms of 
their external relationships, but staunchly 
respect the rights of each to order its own 
society, politics and culture without exter-
nal interference. Neither of these elements 
by itself would make for a concrete alterna-
tive to the Western system, but together 
they synergistically stabilize into a robust 
political-economic order.
Consider first the fact that tradition-
al sources of political-economic power—
labor-intensive industrial capacity, natural 
resource endowments and incremental in-
novation—give the rising powers at the 
nucleus of the World Without the West 
the mercantilist strength in the interna-
tional system that enables them to attain 
their interests. Leveraging its enormous 
human capital, China has truly become the 
“world’s factory”—in the past two decades 
manufacturing facilities for export goods 
as diverse as textiles, metals and comput-
ers have relocated to China from all over 
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east Asia, and China’s share of global man-
ufacturing output doubled. In becoming 
this industrial powerhouse, it has moved in 
less than twenty years roughly 400 million 
people from poverty into a middle class—a 
rate and scale of economic advancement 
that no human economy or society has ever 
before achieved. Along the way the People’s 
Bank of China has accumulated well over a 
trillion dollars worth of foreign exchange 
reserve. Russia, for its part, has brought on 
to world markets considerably more of its 
vast fossil fuel resources, transforming that 
economy from a period of almost unprece-
dented recession-depression after the fall of 
the Soviet Union to an increasingly wealthy 
and self-confident player in the global po-
litical economy. 
Many believe that a reliance on such 
resources is but a stage in development, and 
countries will automatically leap to more 
“modern” political-economic profiles once 
they have passed a certain wealth threshold. 
This view paints the rising powers’ achieve-
ments as transitory—the resource intensive 
outputs of low-wage labor and low-skill 
resource exploitation. This may have been 
a reasonable source of growth for the late 
19th century but surely it is not a sustain-
able and desirable one for the 21st, since 
“knowledge” and other intangible factors 
of production are said to be the key sources 
of wealth in the future. But there is nothing 
inherently unsustainable about an alterna-
tive political-economic order that delivers 
astonishing growth and the accumulation 
of material capacities. Indeed, the political 
economy of the World Without the West 
actually enables its independence from the 
globalized knowledge economy upon which 
American companies base their business 
strategies. 
Factors of production vary in critical 
ways. Knowledge is non-rival—when one 
person or country uses a piece of knowl-
edge that does not reduce the supply of 
knowledge for anyone else. Fossil fuels are 
rival in the simple sense that when I burn 
a barrel of oil it is no longer available for 
you to burn. Those who own the fossil 
fuels and those who can manufacture at 
low cost, by controlling the most rivalrous 
of economic resources, will have outsized 
economic power in the foreseeable future, 
as it has been for more than a century. We 
used to say oil is different from a macroeco-
nomic perspective. It’s fashionable to talk as 
if that is no longer true. But we should be 
careful of the implicit view that the energy 
sector, and particularly the production of 
fossil fuels, is “naturally” or “best” orga-
nized within the private sector, and traded 
as commodities on “global” markets. These 
are huge up-front investment, high fixed-
costs industries that have historically been 
tightly tied to governments. And so regard-
less of what they sometimes say, govern-
ments continue to act as if oil is different. 
In fact, governments and national oil com-
panies today control about two-thirds of 
global reserves. And it is the governments 
of the non-Western world that have most 
aggressively played this game—in Russia, 
Iran and Venezuela of course, but also in 
China, Nigeria, Egypt, Chad, Angola, Azer-
baijan and Turkmenistan. Exxon-Mobil is a 
huge company but only a moderate influ-
ence within the global market. 
Many of these players will surprise 
global markets with how well they do. 
Governments can adequately manage these 
businesses, because the market for man-
agement expertise is far more liquid than 
the market for physical oil assets. They 
will have access to needed investment—in-
cluding from other developing countries, 
which hold excessive dollar assets and will 
be looking for alternative investments with 
higher returns. And they will likely be a 
magnet for the newest technologies, since 
at the end of the day the fossil-fuel reserves 
themselves, and not the technologies to ex-
tract and refine them, are the rate-limiting 
step in the energy value chain. 
In addition to the material resources 
that come with brute manufacturing ca-
pacity and resource endowments, develop-
ing countries leverage a different manner 
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of innovation. The global economy com-
prises comparative advantages that map to 
different sources of innovative potential. 
Capital-rich advanced countries have the 
means to finance the expensive research 
and development necessary for radical in-
novation, and they continue to be the main 
purveyors of technological breakthroughs. 
But emerging economies can rely on their 
rich human resources, track record of or-
ganizational innovation and huge markets 
of increasingly sophisticated consumers to 
make technological advances through pro-
cesses of learning-by-doing and user-driven 
innovation. The Indian tech industry and 
homegrown Indian consumer product sup-
pliers are a key example of this phenom-
enon. In dynamic terms, these incremental 
innovations can cumulate over time into a 
trajectory that matches or even surpasses 
the impact of innovations on the techno-
logical frontier.
IF MANUFACTURING capac-ity, resource endowments and in-
cremental innovation make up the material 
foundation of this political order, the core 
idea that cements it together is “state deter-
mination” as compared to “self-determina-
tion” or individual political rights. Invio-
lable sovereignty in the World Without the 
West rejects key tenets of “modern” liberal 
internationalism and particularly any no-
tion of global civil society or public opinion 
justifying political or military intervention 
in the affairs of the state. With the Treaty 
of Westphalia in 1648, Europe gave sover-
eign leaders the right to determine what re-
ligion was practiced in their territory. The 
21st century neo-Westphalian synthesis of 
the World Without the West replaces reli-
gious autonomy with economic, social and 
cultural autonomy. 
The bargain here is simple and straight-
forward: Sovereign states are empowered to 
set the terms of the relationship inside their 
borders between the government and the 
governed. They then deal with each other 
externally in a market setting and recognize 
no real rights or obligations other than 
to fulfill agreed contracts. International 
institutions have no legitimate business 
other than to serve and facilitate these ends. 
Evolving Western notions of liberal inter-
nationalism—particularly ideas like politi-
cal conditionality on development aid and 
the “responsibility to protect”—have no 
place in this framework. Claims about uni-
versal human values, the “moral reliability” 
of democracy and the like that come from 
Western voices are—self-consciously or 
otherwise—a power game pure and simple, 
an attempt to redefine as “universal” what 
is distinctly the product of a particular cul-
ture, and (declining) power base. There’s 
no need to fight these ideas or assimilate to 
them; they can simply be ignored.
That many readers will see these no-
tions of political order as reactionary, ret-
rograde and unsustainable in the modern 
world says more about the mindset of the 
West than it does about the magnetism of 
the ideas. It is important to remember that 
when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about 
the relationship between equality and de-
mocracy in America, he was commenting 
on the distinctiveness of America, not its 
generalizability to the rest of the world. 
In the post–Cold War era, Western liberal 
internationalism has started to externalize 
one particular aspect—the importance of 
the individual—as the basis of a global po-
litical order. In a globalizing world, states 
should serve people and not the other way 
around. Accountability, rewards and ulti-
mately power belong to individuals. As a 
progressive statement of liberal individual-
ism this notion has many attractions. But it 
makes little sense in much of the world. 
The great irony of the “communist” 
state in the post-Mao era is that the Chi-
nese have essentially adopted liberal indi-
vidualism as an economic ideology in full-
blown form. But they have done so without 
the democratic political component that 
Americans take for granted. “To get rich 
is glorious”, as Deng Xiaoping said. But 
it is also being promoted as a means of 
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individual fulfillment and self-expression 
in societies with communal traditions and 
long histories of relative poverty. “One 
man, one vote” becomes “one man, one cell 
phone”—with the goal to create wealth and 
express one’s individuality through con-
sumption. (Russia is arriving at a similar 
synthesis, albeit in a more tumultuous way.) 
Markets and bargains then are the stuff 
of world politics, not human rights or tran-
scendent moral norms. States appropriately 
deal with each other over technical standards 
and trade arrangements. They do not judge 
others’ electoral or legal systems. They may 
deal on issues of foreign exchange and mon-
etary stability. They do not evaluate others’ 
cultural policies and press freedoms. 
This evolving synthesis is finding its 
expression now in new formal international 
institutions outside the Bretton Woods sys-
tem. The Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO), established in 2001 to advance 
the shared interests of China, Russia, and 
the four Central Asian republics of Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uz-
bekistan, is an example. In 2005, the SCO 
declared its central goal to be the advance-
ment of “multilateral cooperation . . . based 
on the principles of equal right and mutual 
respect, non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of sovereign states.” After rejecting 
the United States’s application for observer 
status it called on Washington to withdraw 
U.S. military personnel from Central Asia, 
backing up Uzbek President Islam Karimov 
in his quarrel with the United States over 
the aggressive suppression of domestic pro-
testers. The SCO has served also as a legiti-
mating cover for Russia’s newly forthright 
view of “sovereign democracy” that treats 
foreign support for domestic opposition 
movements via the presence of NGOs as il-
legitimate external meddling. 
China’s burgeoning relationship with 
the African continent tells a similar story. In 
November 2006, 48 African leaders traveled 
to Beijing to participate in the China-Africa 
Forum. A simple neo-Westphalian deal lay 
behind the billions of renminbi that China 
pledged to invest in infrastructure, develop-
ment and energy projects: Beijing’s money 
would be free of the conditionality usually 
associated with Western assistance and in 
return, the African nations would offer un-
wavering support for the One China policy. 
It is a marriage of convenience that retains 
no role for the United States or the multi-
lateral institutions it leads.
Concrete manifestations of these self-
supporting differences will visibly emerge 
in several core areas of security and eco-
nomic policy. Consider, for example, the 
central role that intellectual-property rules 
play in the value proposition that major 
Western firms construct for a globalizing 
market. The expressed logic behind trade-
related aspects of intellectual-property 
rights (TRIPS), which sought to drive the 
rest of the world toward a convergent path 
with American intellectual property law, 
was that developing countries would benefit 
(eventually) by incentivizing fundamentally 
new innovation in their economies, even 
if they had to pay higher prices for drugs, 
software and other intellectual product ex-
ported from the West along the way. The 
2001 Doha revision of the TRIPS agreement 
recognized de facto the existence of a dis-
tinct set of developing-country interests, at 
least when it came to medicines. 
But the underlying interest is actually 
quite broad. A large developing country like 
India does not need to create new block-
buster drugs. What it needs is to produce 
and distribute at very low cost a vast quan-
tity of existing drug formulations—particu-
larly for the treatment of modern lifestyle 
diseases (metabolic disorders, obesity, hy-
pertension, etc.) that its population is ac-
quiring at an alarming rate. China does not 
need to be the home of fundamental in-
novation in software code. It benefits more 
from widespread distribution of basic com-
puting capabilities—using pirated copies 
of Windows 2000 or freely available Linux 
distributions. In the foreseeable future at 
least, the core trade-off within intellectual-
property law for the World Without the 
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West favors distribution over innovation, 
exactly the opposite of how it works in the 
West. The future of pharmaceuticals in the 
World Without the West looks something 
like this: A Brazilian entrepreneur teams 
with a Chinese biochemist and an Indian 
manufacturer with finance from Venezuela 
to produce generic low-cost treatments for a 
chronic degenerative disease that people in 
a per capita GDP $7,000 setting can afford. 
This (imaginary) consortium won’t have to 
fight against Pfizer and Merck, nor will it 
assimilate to their rules. It will simply route 
around them to create its own pharmaceuti-
cal economy, which will be profitable to its 
firms and beneficial to its customers.
Concurrently, the World Without the 
West is developing its own channels for the 
distribution of information and the spon-
sorship of discourse. In February of this 
year, Wen Jiabao was credited with an ar-
ticle in the official People’s Daily newspaper 
responding to calls for political reform in 
China. The Washington Post led the next 
day with the headline: “China’s Premier 
Calls Democracy A Distant Goal.” Mean-
while, Al-Jazeera declared that, “China’s 
Wen urges more reforms.” With the explo-
sion of alternative sources of information 
and media, it is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult for Western narratives to penetrate 
the developing world—whether they are 
about Iraq, terrorism or trade. Al-Jazeera’s 
principal rival for the Middle East mar-
ket is the Saudi government-financed Al-
Arabiya, not CNN or the BBC. Baidu, the 
prominent Chinese Internet search engine, 
is the fourth most trafficked website in the 
world and—despite its heavy censorship 
by government authorities, its placing of 
advertising as a higher priority than search 
results and its ongoing battles over links to 
copyright-violating music sources—it com-
mands over 60 percent of the first-chosen 
searches in China and continues to gain 
market share. If the ability to shape narra-
tive is one of the most important power re-
sources in international politics, the World 
Without the West now controls its own 
channels.
What should the United States do about 
this?
THE FIRST step in crafting a sen-sible and forward-looking policy 
is to see these developments for what they are—
not for what we wish them to be or what 
we fear. This means acknowledging two 
uncomfortable but profound and intercon-
nected realities of the late twentieth century 
that set the stage for today’s power transi-
tions. The first is that the “Western liberal 
idea” never penetrated deeply into the psy-
chology and politics of much of the world. 
The second and closely connected reality 
is that the dirty little secret of globaliza-
tion is anything but little: At least half the 
world’s population simply did not benefit 
meaningfully from sixty-plus years of West-
ern-led economic growth and technological 
change. For those outside the West who 
did benefit, the vast majority attribute their 
advancement not to liberal ideology, the 
beneficence of the West or the post–World 
War II American-led order, but to state-di-
rected capitalism and resource nationalism 
run by illiberal states. 
So re-surfacing an American commit-
ment to post–World War II style multilat-
eralism with post–World War II institu-
tions is no longer meaningful; in the eyes of 
the World Without the West it is not much 
more than a slogan. In any case, the United 
States has lost many of the old forms of le-
verage that worked in that setting. 
We must face head-on and lean into, 
rather than away from, the real choices that 
we confront. Some are gut-wrenching in 
the sense that they will force us to make 
truly hard compromises among sets of val-
ues, preferences and expectations that we 
don’t want to trade-off. That is no excuse 
to ignore or hide from those choices.
Here are three conceptual options. They 
are not exhaustive, but are representative of 
the kind of thinking we believe is necessary.
The United States can seek to aggres-
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sively block the further development of the 
World Without the West. One way to do 
that would be to try to deprive the major 
rising powers of the material resources that 
have empowered these developments. That 
would mean an economically gut-wrench-
ing reversal of American dependence on the 
Chinese industrial production machine and 
non-Western sources of petroleum. Anoth-
er option would be to force a set of military 
engagements and thus divert the energy of 
this alternative world system toward direct 
security competition with the West. Either 
is conceivable, but the costs and risks are 
likely to be judged prohibitive.
Second, the United States can try to re-
duce the attractiveness of the World With-
out the West. One effective way to do that 
would be to compete for the allegiance of 
states that are “in play”—those that have not 
yet de facto chosen sides. The challenge here 
is to re-engineer the liberal world order 
so that it actually and visibly serves the in-
terests of a large, developing, democratic 
and proudly nationalist country like India, 
rather than just proclaims that it is its goal 
to do so eventually. The same could be said 
for a number of countries in the developing 
world, including Indonesia, Brazil and South 
Africa. Consider then, for example, the very 
different (and domestically difficult) propos-
als Washington would have to put forward 
in discussions about the Doha Development 
Agenda. The end of agricultural subsidies—
today. Licensing of significant protected 
molecules to generic drug manufacturers—
in the short term. An equitable arrangement 
for opening trade in services that levels the 
playing field for developing countries in 
areas like telecommunications and finance. 
Pursuing this type of strategy will require an 
enormous degree of compromise, even sac-
rifice, in American domestic politics. 
Third, the United States can accept 
the World Without the West for what it is. 
There may be some, perhaps many, issue 
areas in which the United States and the 
West are simply prepared to let the World 
Without the West go it alone. In this “live 
and let live” scenario the task would be to 
define the red lines beyond which that is not 
acceptable—and then to focus on control-
ling the points of connection, the bridges 
between the two worlds, the places where 
interdependence is high and unavoidable. 
Climate change and international terrorism 
probably fall into that category; energy sup-
plies and human rights may not. Choosing a 
“live and let live” strategy would entail the 
United States backing down, as never be-
fore, on some of its democratic liberal ideals.
The crux of U.S. policy in this latter 
option would be to manage to our benefit 
the points of interdependence. And to do 
so without indulging the belief, tempting 
though it will be, that those points should 
be manipulated to undermine the viability 
of the alternative order. It is true that any 
notion of world order strains to incorpo-
rate the diverse interests of the many play-
ers that it wishes to attract. The World 
Without the West is, of course, no more 
a monolithic bloc than is the West itself. 
The two could engage in comparable ef-
forts to heighten each others’ internal lines 
of cleavage. Going down that road pulls 
us back into something like a traditional 
bipolar confrontation. But this bipolarity 
would pit the West against an increasingly 
pragmatic bloc of countries led by an eco-
nomic powerhouse, rather than the Cold 
War’s coerced bloc led by an economically 
frail and ideologically strained hegemon. It 
might not end in war, but it also might not 
end with a Western “victory.” 
Doing nothing—or pretending that 
there is nothing other than inevitable con-
flict or assimilation for which we need to 
prepare—is simply no longer a responsible 
foreign-policy agenda.
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